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Abstract—It was recently shown that RGHW (relative gener-
alized Hamming weight) exactly expresses the security of linear
ramp secret sharing scheme. In this paper we determine the true
value of the asymptotic metric for RGHW previously proposed by
Zhuang et al. in 2013. Then we propose new asymptotic metrics
useful for investigating the optimal performance of linear ramp
secret sharing scheme constructed from a pair of linear codes.
We also determine the true values of the proposed metrics in
many cases.
I. Introduction
It was shown in [2], [4] that any pair of nested linear codes
C2 ⊂ C1 ⊂ Fnq can be used for constructing a linear ramp secret
sharing scheme [1], [9]. Recently, Kurihara et al. [6] showed
that the smallest number of shares required for an adversary
to illegitimately obtain at least t log2 q bits of information is
exactly expressed by the t-th relative generalized Hamming
weight (RGHW) of C⊥1 ⊂ C⊥2 proposed by Luo et al. [7].
In order to clarify how good secret sharing schemes can be
constructed from linear codes, it is indispensable to discover
existential bounds on RGHW similar to the Gilbert-Varshamov
bound. Toward this direction, Zhuang et al. [10] and this author
[8] proposed such existential bounds.
In [10], Zhuang et al. proposed an asymptotic metric of
RGHW that is the highest information rate of a larger code
C1 of length n with specified RGHW nδ, and derived lower
bounds on their proposed metric. Firstly we show that the
true value of their metric is 1 − δ in Theorem 7. Then we
argue that their asymptotic metric is a bit inconvenient for
investigating the asymptotically optimal linear ramp secret
sharing scheme mainly because the positive information rate
of information leakage is not taken into account. To overcome
the inconveniences we propose new asymptotic metrics for
RGHW as Definitions 8 and 12 and determine their true values
in many cases in Corollary 11 and Theorem 13 by using [8].
II. Preliminaries
For C2 ⊂ C1 ⊂ Fnq, the t-th RGHW is defined as [7]
Mt(C1,C2) = min
I⊆{1,...,n}
{|I| | dim C1 ∩ VI − dim C2 ∩ VI ≥ t}, (1)
where VI = {(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Fnq | i < I ⇒ xi = 0} for a subset I
of the index set {1, . . . , n}. The author proposed the following
bound:
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Proposition 1: [8, Corollary 3] For integers a, u, v,w, define
N1(w, u) =
∏u−1
i=0 qw − qi∏u−1
i=0 qu − qi
(2)
N2(w, u, v) =
∏v−1
i=0 q
w − qu+i∏v−1
i=0 qv − qi
(3)
N3(w, u, v, a) = N1(u, a) · N2(w − a, u − a, v − a). (4)
There exists a nested pair C2 ⊂ C1 ⊂ Fnq of linear codes with
dim C1 = k1 and dim C2 = k2 such that Mt(C1,C2) ≥ d if1
1 ≤ t ≤ k1 − k2 − 1 and(
n
d
) k1−k2∑
b=t+1
min{d−b,k1−b,k2}∑
a=0
N1(d, a) · N2(n − a, d − a, k2 − a)
·N3(n − k2, d − a, k1 − k2, b)
< N1(n, k2) · N1(n − k2, k1 − k2). (5)
Proof: See [8].
In order to derive asymptotic expressions, we need the
following lemmas.
Lemma 2: [5, Corollary 2] Define pi(q) = ∏∞i=1(1 − q−i).
Then we have
pi(q)qu(w−u) ≤ N1(w, u) ≤ pi(q)−1qu(w−u). (6)
Lemma 3:
N2(w, u, v) ≤ pi(q)−1qv(w−v) (7)
N3(w, u, v, a) ≤ pi(q)−1qu(u−a)q(v−a)(w−v). (8)
Proof: Equation (7) follows from (6) and N2(w, u, v) ≤
N2(w, 0, v) = N1(w, v). Equation (8) follows from (6) and (7).
In order to evaluate the binomial coefficient asymptotically,
we use the following lemma.
Lemma 4: [3, Example 11.1.3] Define Hq(x) = −x logq x −
(1 − x) logq(1 − x). Then
1
n + 1
qnHq(m/n) ≤
(
n
m
)
≤ qnHq(m/n). (9)
We shall use the Singleton bound in proofs of Lemma 6,
Theorem 7 and Corollary 11.
Proposition 5 (Singleton bound): [10] For any C2 ⊂ C1 ⊂
Fnq we have Mt(C1, C2) + dim C1 ≤ n + t.
1t ≤ k1 − k2 − 1 was forgotten in [8, Corollary 3].
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III. AsymptoticMetrics for RGHW
Zhuang et al. [10] introduced the following asymptotic
metric α(t)q (δ) = lim supn→∞ max{dim C1/n | there exists some
C2 ⊂ C1 ⊂ Fnq such that Mt(C1, C2)/n ≥ δ}. In order to
investigate the best realizable performance of secret shar-
ing asymptotically, there are the following inconveniences in
α
(t)
q (δ).
1) t does not grow with n in α(t)q (δ) and t/n tends to zero as
n → ∞. In the context of secret sharing, t/n represents
the rate of information leaked to an adversary who has
collected shares illegitimately. In the ramp secret sharing
scheme [1], [9], it is important to analyze nonzero
information leakage as well as the zero information
leakage. The definition of α(t)q (δ) cannot enable such
analysis.
2) The definition of α(t)q (δ) does not take dim C2 into
account. The information rate of secret messages is
(dim C1 − dim C2)/n in secret sharing, but α(t)q (δ) does
not enable analysis of information rate.
3) We shall show in Theorem 7 α(t)q (δ) = 1−δ, which makes
α
(t)
q (δ) independent of t in addition to dim C2.
Lemma 6: For any 0 ≤ k2 < k1 ≤ n and any prime power q,
if t = k1 − k2 then there exists C2 ⊂ C1 ⊂ Fnq such that Mt(C1,
C2) = n + t − k1.
Proof: Let C2 be VJ with J = {1, 2, . . . , k2} if k2 ≥ 1 and
C2 = {0} if k2 = 0. Let D be any (k1 − k2)-dimensional space
whose support is {k2+1, . . . , n}. Clearly we have D∩C2 = {0}.
Let C1 = D +C2.
In order for VI in (1) to satisfy dim C1∩VI−dim C2∩VI ≥ t,
VI must contain D, which makes |I| ≥ n− k2 = n+ t− k1. This
shows Mt(C1, C2) ≥ n+ t − k1. On the other hand, Mt(C1, C2)
cannot be larger than n+ t−k1 because of the Singleton bound
for RGHW [10].
Theorem 7:
α(t)q (δ) = 1 − δ. (10)
Proof: Let d = ⌊nδ⌋, k1 = n+ t−d, k2 = n−d. By Lemma
6 there exist C2 ⊂ C1 ⊂ Fq such that dim C1 = n + t − ⌊nδ⌋,
dim C2 = n − ⌊nδ⌋, and Mt(C1, C2) = ⌊nδ⌋. Letting n → ∞
shows α(t)q (δ) ≥ 1−δ. The Singleton bound shows α(t)q (δ) ≤ 1−δ.
In order to overcome these inconveniences, we propose the
following asymptotic metric for RGHW:
Definition 8: δq(τ, R1, R2) = lim supn→∞ max{d/n | there
exists some C2 ⊂ C1 ⊂ Fnq such that t ≤ nτ, dim C1 ≥ nR1,
dim C2 ≤ nR2, Mt(C1, C2) ≥ d}.
The proposed new metric has the following operational mean-
ings: δq(τ,R1,R2) is the largest fraction of shares in secret
sharing constructed from a code C1 with information rate R1
and C2 with R2 with which an adversary with arbitrary nδq
shares has at most τ log2 q bits of information per codeword
symbol.
IV. Asymptotic Analysis
Theorem 9: Fix 0 ≤ R1 ≤ 1, 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 and 0 < τ ≤ min{R1,
δ}. If
R1 + δ < 1 + τ, (11)
then for any 0 ≤ R2 ≤ R1 − τ, any prime power q, and
sufficiently large n, there exist C2 ⊂ C1 ⊂ Fnq such that
dim C1 = ⌊nR1⌋, dim C2 = ⌈nR2⌉, and M⌈nτ⌉(C1, C2) ≥ ⌊nδ⌋.
Proof: We shall show that (11) implies (5) when n is
large. Fix R2 and q as assumed in the theorem. Observe that∑
f ( j) ≤ max f ( j) × the number of terms in
∑
. (12)
By using this idea and (6)–(9), we see the left hand side of
(5) is less than or equal to
(k1 − k2 − t)(1 + min{d − b, k1 − b, k2})pi(q)−4︸                                                      ︷︷                                                      ︸
=poly(n)
(13)
×exponential function of n.
We also see that the right hand side of (5) is also an exponen-
tial function of n. In order to seek a sufficient condition for
(5) when n is large, we can ignore poly(n) in (13), take logq,
and divide it by n2 (not n). Then by using (6)–(9) and (12)
we see that
k2
n
(
1 − k2
n
)
+
(
k1
n
−
k2
n
) (
1 − k1
n
)
> max
t/n+1/n≤b/n≤k1/n−k2/n,0≤a/n≤min{d/n−b/n,k1/n−b/n,k2/n}
[ Hq(d/n)
n
+ a/n(d/n − a/n) + (k2/n − a/n)(1 − k2/n)
+(b/n)(d/n− a/n − b/n) + (k1/n − k2/n − b/n)(1 − k1/n)]
(14)
is a sufficient condition for (5) when n is large. Observe that
the maximum is always achieved at b = t + 1 and we can
substitute b by t + 1. By identifying R1, R2, α, δ, τ with k1/n,
k2/n, a/n, d/n, t/n we see that
R2(1 − R2) + (R1 − R2)(1 − R1)
>
Hq(δ)
n
+ max
0≤α≤min{δ−τ,R1−τ,R2}
[α(δ − α) + (R2 − α)(1 − R2)
+τ(δ − α − τ) + (R1 − R2 − τ)(1 − R1)], (15)
is a sufficient condition for (14) when n is sufficiently large.
Since δ ≥ τ, we see that the maximum in (15) is achieved at
α = 0. Substituting α = 0 into (15) yields
R2(1 − R2) + (R1 − R2)(1 − R1)
>
Hq(δ)
n
+ R2(1 − R2) + τ(δ − τ) + (R1 − R2 − τ)(1 − R1).
(16)
Subtracting R2(1−R2)+(R1−R2)(1−R1) from both sides yields
0 >
Hq(δ)
n
+ τ(R1 + δ − 1 − τ). (17)
Since we have assumed τ > 0 we can divide (17) by τ, ignore
Hq(δ)
n
and obtain (11).
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Fig. 1. Comparison of lower bounds on δ0q(t,R1,R2) for q = 4 and t = 2.
Remark 10: One can deduce Theorem 9 not only from
Proposition 1 but also from [10, Theorem 2 or 3].
Corollary 11: If τ > 0 or τ = R1 − R2 then
δq(τ,R1,R2) = 1 + τ − R1.
Proof: For τ > 0, Theorem 9 shows δq(τ,R1,R2) ≥ 1+τ−
R1. For τ = R1−R2, Lemma 6 does it. The opposite inequality
follows from the Singleton bound for RGHW.
When τ = 0 and R1 > R2, the situation is unclear. In order
to investigate that case, we introduce another definition.
Definition 12: Let t be a positive integer. δ0q(t, R1, R2) =
lim supn→∞ max{d/n | there exists some C2 ⊂ C1 ⊂ Fnq such
that dim C1 ≥ nR1, dim C2 ≤ nR2, Mt(C1, C2) ≥ d}.
Theorem 13:
δ0q(t,R1,R1) = 1 − R1 (18)
δ0q(t,R1,R2) ≥ 1 −
Hq(δ)
t
− R1. (19)
Proof: Equation (18) follows from Lemma 6. To show
(19), by substituting τ = t/n to (17) and multiplying n to both
sides, we obtain
0 > Hq(δ) + t(R1 + δ − 1 − t/n).
Dividing it by t yields
δ < 1 + t
n
−
Hq(δ)
t
− R1
as a sufficient condition for (5) when n is large, and we see
(19).
As t → ∞ (19) tends to 1−R1, which seems consistent with
Corollary 11. Zhuang et al. [10, Eq. (25)] showed
δ
0
q(t,R1,R2) ≥ max{δ | R1 ≥ 1 − δ +
δ
t
logq
δ
1 − q−t
+
1 − δ
t
logq(1 − δ)}. (20)
As t → ∞ (20) also tends to 1−R1. (19) and (20) are compared
in Fig. 1 for q = 4 and t = 2.
V. Conclusion
In this paper we determined the true value of the asymptotic
metric for RGHW proposed by Zhuang et al. [10]. Then we
proposed new asymptotic metrics useful for analysis of ramp
secret sharing schemes. We also determined the true values of
the proposed metrics in many cases.
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